The escalating tension between Iran and Israel since June 13 crossed a critical threshold on June 22 with the direct intervention of the United States. In an operation that began around 3:30 a.m., U.S. forces targeted three nuclear facilities in Iran—Fordow (underground), Natanz, and Isfahan—through highly precise air and naval strikes. The attack, carried out with GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs dropped by B-2 bombers and dozens of Tomahawk missiles launched from submarines, was conducted in full coordination with Israel.
Following the operation, U.S. President Trump announced at 05:25 Turkish time that Iran’s nuclear infrastructure had been severely damaged and declared that it was now “time for peace.” However, statements by both Trump and Netanyahu revealed that the true aim of the strike was to force Iran into diplomacy through power. The U.S. Department of Defense stated that the operation was not intended to bring about regime change and had been planned with utmost secrecy. The assertion by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth that the operation had been in planning for weeks or months raised questions as to whether this preparation coincided with the ongoing nuclear negotiations. This statement provided grounds for debates about whether military planning had been carried out in parallel with the diplomatic process.
After the attack, the Gulf Cooperation Council announced that radiation levels in the Gulf countries remained within technically safe limits. In response to escalating regional tensions, Iran’s Parliament announced that a temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz—a critical chokepoint through which nearly one-third of the world’s seaborne crude oil passes—was deemed necessary. The final decision, however, lies with the Supreme National Security Council, overseen by Ali Khamenei. The Iranian government defined the move as “a legitimate defense against foreign interventions threatening national security,” while the initial reactions from the international community pointed to a worrisome escalation.
The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, holds strategic importance. At its narrowest point, it measures only 33 kilometers (21 miles) wide. It serves as a critical passage for Middle Eastern oil and LNG exports to global markets. Each day, approximately 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products, and 290 million cubic meters of LNG, transit through the Strait. About 30% of the world’s oil exports and 20% of global LNG trade pass through this energy artery. Saudi Arabia is the leading oil exporter through the strait, while Qatar dominates LNG exports—conducting nearly 90% of its LNG trade via this route. Approximately 80% of the oil passing through the strait is shipped to Asian countries, with 45% of that forming part of China’s total oil imports. 80% of LNG exports from Qatar and the UAE are directed toward Asia, while 20% go to Europe.
The closure of the strait could cause a spike in global inflation, particularly for energy-import-dependent European nations. If shipping routes are disrupted, serious crises could emerge in the production, transportation, and agriculture sectors. Supply chain delays could affect Europe’s imports of raw materials, electronics, and consumer goods. Insurance premiums for shipping may rise, increasing costs for European businesses and consumers. Beyond Europe, Lebanon—entirely dependent on fuel from Iraq—would face a severe power outage in the event of closure.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), if the Strait of Hormuz were to be closed, alternative pipelines could only handle about one-quarter of the displaced oil volume. This could lead to a significant supply shortage and sharp price hikes.
Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar lack clear alternatives to the strait. Qatar, the top LNG trader via Hormuz, would face major disruptions to its energy trade in such a scenario, which would present grave challenges particularly for major LNG-importing Asian nations. Thus, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is not only a matter of energy security, but also a development with serious implications for peace and international law. For instance, if Qatar fails to meet its obligations under energy contracts, its image as a “reliable supplier” may be damaged.
While Saudi Arabia and the UAE possess alternative pipeline routes, they do not provide a full solution in the event of a closure. These pipelines are not typically used at full capacity, and approximately 2.6 million barrels per day of oil can be rerouted via Saudi and UAE pipelines during a supply disruption. Saudi Aramco operates the 7 million barrels/day capacity East-West Pipeline, stretching from the Abqaiq processing center near the Persian Gulf to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea. Crude oil can be redirected to the Red Sea via this line. However, due to security risks such as Houthi attacks, this line is already operating near full capacity.
The UAE’s Fujairah Pipeline has a daily capacity of 1.8 million barrels but offers limited flexibility due to heavy use. As for Iran’s Goreh-Jask Pipeline, despite a theoretical capacity of 300,000 barrels per day, it was transporting only about 70,000 barrels daily before going offline in late 2024, greatly reducing its effectiveness. If Iran shuts down the Strait of Hormuz, the country’s fragile economy will also take a serious hit.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), in the event of a closure, Saudi Arabia and the UAE could only redirect about 2.6 million barrels of oil per day to alternative routes. This is far below the approximately 20 million barrels that normally pass through Hormuz daily. Despite efforts toward economic diversification, Gulf countries—particularly Saudi Arabia—remain heavily reliant on oil and natural gas exports. Prolonged disruptions could trigger budget deficits across the region.
The U.S. imports about half a million barrels of oil per day from the Gulf, accounting for around 7% of its total imports. This makes the U.S. less vulnerable compared to Asian and European countries. Nonetheless, it could still suffer from a rise in global prices. The U.S. may attempt to ease restrictions on oil-producing countries such as Venezuela to alleviate market supply pressures.
By restricting access to energy resources, the risk of direct conflict increases. The fragile balance of power in the region could be further destabilized. If Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz using military force, it could face strong retaliation from the U.S., NATO, and Gulf countries. At the heart of the crisis lie the political pressures caused by economic sanctions and policies of regional isolation imposed on Iran. In this context, keeping diplomatic dialogue and negotiation channels open is of critical importance.
The responses of direct stakeholders in the region—such as the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel—will shape the course of the crisis. Meanwhile, countries such as Turkey, Qatar, and Oman are seen as having potential to mediate in the search for a diplomatic solution. In this regard, the Istanbul Peace Research Center (IPRC) emphasizes the prioritization of diplomatic tools over power rivalries.
This development also marks a period where peace diplomacy is being tested. The establishment of multilateral negotiation platforms, the encouragement of Track II diplomacy initiatives, and the development of neutral mediation mechanisms could take center stage in this process. IPRC advocates for the strengthening of pre-conflict diplomatic structures as a foundation for long-term peace.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz goes beyond an energy security crisis, bringing forth a comprehensive debate across diplomacy, human security, and international law. The Istanbul Peace Research Center believes that in such moments of crisis, models for conflict-free resolution must be developed, and regional peace initiatives must be supported.