Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reshaped not only the battlefields but also the diplomatic reflexes of countries beyond the frontlines. As a state caught in the fragile balances of the Caucasus, Georgia has found itself at a crossroads of internal political tension and foreign policy recalibration in the aftermath of the war.
While maintaining its goal of integration with the West, the Georgian government has avoided confronting Moscow directly, instead adopting a foreign policy line characterized by what it calls a “cautious balance.” However, the widening gap between the public’s strong desire for alignment with the West and the government’s measured stance becomes more visible with each passing day.
This observation examines Georgia’s strategic positioning during the Ukraine war, focusing on the tension between public sentiment and state policy, relations with regional actors, and future strategic orientations. Drawing also on interviews conducted with the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS), the study discusses Georgia’s potential to emerge as a “strategic actor” within the interplay of internal and external pressures.
Positioning Amid Geopolitical Uncertainty: Georgia’s Strategic Preferences During the Ukraine War
Russia’s full-scale military assault on Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point for Georgia—not only as a regional threat but also as a catalyst for recalibrating its internal and external political compass. From the outset of the war, the Tbilisi administration adopted a stance based on three core strategic pillars: refraining from joining sanctions against Russia, avoiding direct military assistance to Ukraine, and conducting a cautious diplomacy to maintain relations with the West (MFA Georgia). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs justified this position within the framework of “national interest” and “economic security,” a stance reinforced both rhetorically and economically. The 40% increase in exports to Russia between 2022 and 2024 illustrates the economic dependencies underpinning this policy (Ankasam, 2023).
However, this cautious approach has provoked considerable public discontent. Georgian society, drawing upon the historical memory of the 2008 war, has developed strong empathy toward Ukraine. Large-scale protests in Tbilisi and other cities have demonstrated a form of solidarity that extends far beyond the government’s “protective neutrality” approach (Euronews, 2023). Civil society organizations, volunteer fighters, and even local religious actors have voiced support, revealing a deep divergence between state policy and public sentiment. Although the Georgian Orthodox Church maintained institutional neutrality, many local clergy openly supported Ukraine and launched humanitarian campaigns (Civil Georgia, 2022).
This divide has manifested not only socially, but also politically. Opposition parties have accused the government of excessive caution vis-à-vis Russia, warning that such a stance jeopardizes Georgia’s integration into the EU and NATO. Georgia’s failure to obtain EU candidate status in 2022 alongside Ukraine and Moldova was perceived as a result not only of insufficient democratic reforms but also of ambiguous foreign policy signals (The Guardian, 2024). The European Commission notably highlighted regressions in judicial independence and media freedom, intensifying the tension between Western reform expectations and the government’s preservationist orientation (IKV).
Behind this cautious diplomacy lies not only structural economic dependency but also a set of unwritten strategic red lines. The de facto Russian control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia has compelled Georgia to avoid provoking Moscow. Following the war’s onset, a substantial influx of Russian migrants further complicated matters, creating socio-economic tensions and fueling claims of a “silent occupation” by opposition circles. In this context, Georgia’s reluctance to provide military assistance to Ukraine reflects a broader security doctrine prioritizing internal stability (Civil.ge).
To understand these layered dynamics more thoroughly, interviews were conducted with the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) in Tbilisi. According to GFSIS expert Alex Petriashvili, the government’s refusal to mention Moscow by name in official statements is not merely a diplomatic formality—it also reflects the pervasive economic, social, and psychological influence of Russia in Georgia. Petriashvili recalled the deaths of 18 Georgian volunteers in Ukraine, underlining that public support is not only symbolic but also deeply practical. Yet the absence of this societal awareness in political decision-making exposes the persistent gap between Georgia’s foreign policy and its domestic sentiment.
Petriashvili asserts that Georgia operates within an implicit, unwritten strategic framework: avoiding direct confrontation with Moscow while preserving ties with the West. Within this framework, regional trilateral cooperation initiatives—such as those with Turkey and Ukraine—alongside Black Sea security and energy diplomacy, form the backbone of Georgia’s indirect Western alignment. However, expectations of “normalizing” relations with Russia are widely viewed as unrealistic unless a fundamental shift occurs within the Russian regime itself.
According to GFSIS analysis, the Ukraine war has effectively nullified Georgia’s traditional “policy of balance.” While Western integration has become a strategic imperative, institutionalizing this trajectory is hindered by structural dependencies, migration-driven vulnerabilities, and the vested interests of domestic political actors. Georgia’s deterrence strategy thus relies not on military capacity but on multilateral cooperation with Turkey and Ukraine, offering “strategic solidarity platforms” rather than open alliances.
In conclusion, Georgia’s stance on the Ukraine war should not be interpreted merely as a geopolitical positioning strategy, but rather as a fragile balancing act shaped by domestic public opinion, regime security, and economic dependence. The sustainability of this balance will be determined not only by governmental decisions but also by the transformative demands of Georgian society and the broader Western vision for the region.
Fragility, Resolve, and Neighborhood: Georgia’s Regional Standing in the Post-Ukraine War Era
The war in Ukraine has prompted Georgia to undertake not merely a regional policy response but also a strategic reorientation of its foreign policy. While aiming to maintain its path toward Euro-Atlantic integration, the Tbilisi government has carefully avoided direct confrontation with Russia, thus positioning the country on a fragile yet pragmatic foreign policy trajectory. While progress in NATO relations remains incremental, Georgia has had to strike a balance between public expectations and mounting regional security challenges (NATO 2023 Vilnius Summit Communiqué). In the EU accession process, Georgia’s exclusion from candidate status in 2022—granted to Ukraine and Moldova—was perceived as a critical setback by both political elites and the public. Although the European Commission later proposed candidate status in late 2023, it emphasized that further integration would require a clearer stance against Russia (European Commission Report on Georgia, 2022).
The 2008 Bucharest Summit, where NATO pledged eventual membership, was soon followed by the Russia–Georgia war, creating a deep collective security trauma within Georgian society. These wounds have been reopened by the Ukraine war, yet NATO’s support for Georgia remains largely rhetorical, with tangible assistance limited to technical cooperation (NATO Official Record).
In this climate of uncertainty, Georgia has pursued a policy of “strategic patience,” spreading out its integration efforts to reduce internal political risks. However, this cautious approach has drawn increasing criticism from the opposition and civil society. Widespread protests throughout Tbilisi in 2022 and 2023 revealed strong public demands for a clearer Western alignment—demands the government has struggled to meet, resulting in a growing rift between domestic pressures and foreign policy actions (Euronews Türkçe, 2023).
This strategic entrapment has led Georgia to explore alternative regional partnerships. Turkey has emerged as a key player in both energy and security domains. Projects like the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum pipelines have positioned Georgia as an indispensable transit hub, while joint logistical cooperation under the Middle Corridor framework has generated a shared security synergy (EDAM, 2022). Despite Turkey’s assertive role in the Ukraine war contrasting with Georgia’s cautious stance, Ankara continues to be perceived as a strategic balancing force within NATO. While support for Georgia’s territorial integrity has remained mostly symbolic, Turkish investments and energy diplomacy have considerably deepened bilateral ties (Reuters, 2025). According to experts at GFSIS, the regional security architecture is no longer solely defined by Azerbaijan–Armenia tensions, but also by Turkey’s expanding role, Georgia’s multilateral strategic engagement, and Russia’s hegemonic pressure. Avoiding formal alliances, Georgia seeks to construct a distinctive, cautious yet functional position through energy and logistics-based partnerships.
Likewise, energy cooperation with Azerbaijan has played a pivotal role in Georgia’s strategy to reduce dependency on Russia. Infrastructure projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars Railway are not only economic ventures but also instruments of strategic integration. Though the Turkey–Azerbaijan–Georgia trio refrains from forming formal military alliances, they implicitly generate a regional solidarity model through energy and logistics collaboration. Within this framework, Georgia plays a quiet yet stable role—seeking deeper integration with the West while maintaining functional relations with its regional counterparts (EDAM, 2022).
(Figure 1: A current map showing Turkey’s position in the Middle Corridor and its logistical connections across the region – Anadolu Ajansı, 2022)
According to GFSIS expert Tornike Turmanidze, Turkey is no longer merely a transit partner but a regional actor capable of shaping strategic direction. Its multi-layered relations with the West and geopolitical agility offer Georgia both a strategic example and maneuvering space in its foreign policy. Turmanidze emphasizes that Georgia closely follows Turkey’s EU accession journey, viewing Turkey’s progress—or stagnation—as influential in shaping its own political agenda. In this regard, Turkey is not just a corridor, but a regional reference point. Conversely, Azerbaijan and Armenia’s deeper military and diplomatic engagements with Moscow reinforce their divergence from Georgia’s West-centered multilateral strategy. This divergence compels Georgia to construct a more autonomous and multi-vector security architecture.
Relations with Armenia remain far more cautious. Armenia’s close military and diplomatic ties with Russia are viewed as potential security risks by Georgia, particularly given its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (Carnegie Europe). Consequently, Tbilisi keeps economic relations with Yerevan limited, while infrastructure projects such as the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars Railway symbolically exclude Armenia, subtly reflecting Georgia’s regional preference.
Within this multilayered balance strategy, Russia continues to be the most defining external actor for Georgia. The de facto Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia has solidified Georgia’s instinct to avoid open confrontation. Moscow’s coercive mechanisms are not limited to military pressure—they extend into economic, social, and cultural realms as well. This multidimensional pressure reinforces Georgia’s pursuit of a cautious, multi-vector diplomacy instead of hard-line positioning (JamNews). Turmanidze also notes that the stagnation of Georgia’s NATO accession and limited progress with the EU have rekindled a public “fear of isolation,” particularly exacerbated by Russia’s continued occupation of Georgian territory.
Ultimately, Georgia, amid the geopolitical turbulence triggered by the Ukraine war, strives to sustain its Euro-Atlantic integration path while simultaneously developing multilateral strategies to balance Russia’s regional influence. While energy and security cooperation with Turkey and Azerbaijan constitutes a critical pillar of this approach, the stagnation in relations with NATO and the EU underscores a growing tension between domestic aspirations and the government’s cautious pragmatism. The sustainability of this fragile equilibrium will depend not only on the stances of regional actors but also on the political backing of the West and Georgia’s internal capacity for transformation.
Diplomatic Lessons: Georgia’s Internal Transformation and Strategic Choices
Georgia’s position on the war in Ukraine offers deep insights not only into its current foreign policy preferences, but also into the country’s internal transformation, security vision, and societal vulnerabilities. Public support for Ukraine is rooted in historical memory and shared trauma, yet the government’s cautious stance has fallen short in translating this solidarity into concrete policy.
While popular backing for integration with the West manifests in street protests, volunteer initiatives, and religious solidarity networks, political elites maintain a guarded diplomatic approach due to concerns over economic dependence, security risks, and domestic stability. This gap signals not just a divide between domestic and foreign policy, but a fundamental identity conflict regarding Georgia’s future trajectory.
Western actors’ calls for reform, transparency, and a firmer stance against Russia are met with limited institutional capacity within Georgia’s fragile infrastructure. In this context, the role of think tanks, academics, and civil society becomes increasingly vital. The production of strategic thinking and the articulation of alternative security visions that can influence decision-makers are only possible through these platforms.
Insights from interviews with experts at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) also underscore that Georgia’s transformation is not driven solely by external alignments but also by growing internal pressures. Experts emphasize that following the Ukraine war, public demand for Western integration has become more vocal, while political elites have developed a reflex to preserve the status quo, motivated by regime security, economic dependencies, and potential social unrest. This dual structure generates not only a foreign policy dilemma but also a profound tension between competing visions of national identity. Georgia’s path at this fragile juncture will depend not only on government decisions but also on the strategic vision produced by think tanks, independent media, and the emerging generation of intellectuals. For Georgia to evolve into a proactive, agenda-setting actor, institutional capacity must be strengthened not just externally, but also through inward-looking reforms. Otherwise, the current strategy of cautious balance may offer short-term stability but risks becoming a source of long-term strategic fragility.
All things considered, Georgia faces a fundamental question: cautious balance or transformative agency? The answer lies not solely in the hands of the government, but in a collective strategic vision shaped by society, institutions, and international partners.
References
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Prepared by Fatma Dugu TEKER